Every Central Bank for Itself

By John Mauldin

“Everybody has a plan until they get punched in the face.”

– Mike Tyson

For the last 25 days I’ve been traveling in Argentina and South Africa, two countries whose economies can only be described as fragile, though for very different reasons. Emerging market countries face a significantly different set of challenges than the developed world does. These challenges are compounded by the rather indifferent policies of developed world central banks, which are (even if somewhat understandably) entirely self centered. Argentina has brought its problems upon itself, but South Africa can somewhat justifiably express frustration at the developed world, which, as one emerging market central bank leader suggests, is engaged in a covert currency war, one where the casualties are the result of unintended consequences. But the effects are nonetheless real if you’re an emerging market country.

While I will write a little more about my experience in South Africa at the end of this letter, first I want to cover the entire emerging market landscape to give us some context. Full and fair disclosure requires that I give a great deal of credit to my rather brilliant young associate, Worth Wray, who’s helped me pull together a great deal of this letter while I am on the road in a very busy speaking tour here in South Africa for Glacier, a local platform intermediary. They have afforded me the opportunity to meet with a significant number of financial industry participants and local businessman, at all levels of society. It has been a very serious learning experience for me. But more on that later; let’s think now about the problems facing emerging markets in general.

Every Central Bank for Itself

Every general has a plan before going into battle, which immediately begins to change upon contact with the enemy. Everyone has a plan until they get hit… and emerging markets have already taken a couple of punches since May 2013, when Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke first signaled his intent to “taper” his quantitative easing program and thereby incrementally wean the markets off of their steady drip of easy money. It was not too long after that Ben also suggested that he was not responsible for the problems of emerging-market central banks – or any other central bank, for that matter.

As my friend Ben Hunt wrote back in late January, Chairman Bernanke turned a single data point into a line during his last months in office, when he decided to taper by exactly $10 billion per month. He established the trend, and now the markets are reacting as if the Fed's exit strategy has officially begun.

Whether the FOMC can actually turn the taper into a true exit strategy ultimately depends on how much longer households and businesses must deleverage and how sharply our old age dependency ratio rises, but markets seem to believe this is the beginning of the end. For now, that’s what matters most.

Under Fed Chair Janet Yellen’s leadership, the Fed continues to send a clear message to the rest of the world: Now it really is every central bank for itself. 

The QE-Induced Bubble Boom in Emerging Markets

By trying to shore up their rich-world economies with unconventional policies such as ultra low rate targets, outright balance sheet expansion, and aggressive forward guidance, major central banks have distorted international real interest rate differentials and forced savers to seek out higher (and far riskier) returns for more than five years.

This initiative has fueled enormous overinvestment and capital misallocation – and not just in advanced economies like the United States.

As it turns out, the biggest QE-induced imbalances may be in emerging markets, where, even in the face of deteriorating fundamentals, accumulated capital inflows (excluding China) have nearly DOUBLED, from roughly $5 trillion in 2009 to nearly $10 trillion today. After such a dramatic rise in developed world portfolio allocations and direct lending to emerging markets, developed world investors now hold roughly one third of all emerging market stocks by market capitalization and also about one third of all outstanding emerging market bonds.

The Fed might as well have aimed its big bazooka right at the emerging world. That’s where a lot of the easy money ran blindly in search of more attractive real interest rates, bolstered by a broadly accepted growth story.

The conventional wisdom – a particularly powerful narrative that became commonplace in the media – suggested that emerging markets were, for the first time in a long time, less risky than developed markets, despite their having displayed much higher volatility throughout the past several decades.

As a general rule, people believed emerging markets had much lower levels of government debt, much stronger prospects for consumption led growth, and far more favorable demographics. (They overlooked the fact that crises in the 1980s and 1990s still limited EM borrowing limits until 2009 and ignored the fact that EM consumption is a derivative of demand and investment from the developed world.)

Instead of holding traditional safe haven bonds like US treasuries or German bunds, some strategists (who shall not be named) even suggested that emerging market government bonds could be the new safe haven in the event of major sovereign debt crises in the developed world. And better yet, it was suggested that denominating these investments in local currencies would provide extra returns over time as EM currencies appreciated against their developed market peers.

Sadly, the conventional wisdom about emerging markets and their currencies was dead wrong. Herd money (typically momentum based, yield chasing investors) usually chases growth that has already happened and almost always overstays its welcome. This is the same disappointing boom/bust dynamic that happened in Latin America in the early 1980s and Southeast Asia in the mid 1990s. And this time, it seems the spillover from extreme monetary accommodation in advanced countries has allowed public and private borrowers to leverage well past their natural carrying capacity.

Anatomy of a “Balance of Payments” Crisis

The lesson is always the same, and it is hard to avoid. Economic miracles are almost always too good to be true. Whether we’re talking about the Italian miracle of the ’50s, the Latin American miracle of the ’80s, the Asian Tiger miracles of the ’90s, or the housing boom in the developed world (the US, Ireland, Spain, et al.) in the ’00s, they all have two things in common: construction (building booms, etc.) and excessive leverage. As a quick aside, does that remind you of anything happening in China these days?

Just saying…...Broad based, debt fueled overinvestment may appear to kick economic growth into overdrive for a while; but eventually disappointing returns and consequent selling lead to investment losses, defaults, and banking panics. And in cases where foreign capital seeking strong growth in already highly valued assets drives the investment boom, the miracle often ends with capital flight and currency collapse.

Economists call that dynamic of inflow induced booms followed by outflow induced currency crises a “balance of payments cycle,” and it tends to occur in three distinct phases.

In the first phase, an economic boom attracts foreign capital, which generally flows toward productive uses and reaps attractive returns from an appreciating currency and rising asset prices. In turn, those profits fuel a self-reinforcing cycle of foreign capital inflows, rising asset prices, and a strengthening currency.

In the second phase, the allure of promising recent returns morphs into a growth story and attracts ever stronger capital inflows – even as the boom begins to fade and the strong currency starts to drag on competitiveness. Capital piles into unproductive uses and fuels overinvestment, overconsumption, or both; so that ever more inefficient economic growth increasingly depends on foreign capital inflows. Eventually, the system becomes so unstable that anything from signs of weak earnings growth to an unanticipated rate hike somewhere else in the world can trigger a shift in sentiment and precipitous capital flight.

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The article Thoughts from the Frontline: "Every Central Bank for Itself" was originally published at Mauldin Economics

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The Unintended Consequences of ZIRP

By John Mauldin

Yellen's coronation was this week. Art Cashin mused that it was a wonder some senator did not bring her a corsage: it was that type of confirmation hearing. There were a few interesting questions and answers, but by and large we heard what we already knew. And what we know is that monetary policy is going to be aggressively biased to the easy side for years, or at least that is the current plan. Far more revealing than the testimony we heard on Thursday were the two very important papers that were released last week by the two most senior and respected Federal Reserve staff economists. As Jan Hatzius at Goldman Sachs reasoned, it is not credible to believe that these papers and the thinking that went into them were not broadly approved by both Ben Bernanke and Janet Yellen.

Essentially the papers make an intellectual and theoretical case for an extended period of very low interest rates and, in combination with other papers from both inside and outside the Fed from heavyweight economists, make a strong case for beginning to taper sooner rather than later, but for accompanying that tapering with a commitment to an even more protracted period of ZIRP (zero interest rate policy). In this week's letter we are going analyze these papers, as they are critical to understanding the future direction of Federal Reserve policy. Secondly, we'll look at what I think may be some of the unintended consequences of long-term ZIRP.

We are going to start with an analysis by Gavyn Davies of the Financial Times. He writes on macroeconomics and is one of the more of the astute observers I read. I commend his work to you. Today, rather than summarize his analysis, I feel it is more appropriate to simply quote parts of it. (I will intersperse comments, unindented.) The entire piece can be found here.

While the markets have become obsessively focused on the date at which the Fed will start to taper its asset purchases, the Fed itself, in the shape of its senior economics staff, has been thinking deeply about what the stance of monetary policy should be after tapering has ended. This is reflected in two papers to be presented to the annual IMF research conference this week by William English and David Wilcox, who have been described as two of the most important macro-economists working for the FOMC at present. At the very least, these papers warn us what the FOMC will be hearing from their staff economists in forthcoming meetings.

The English paper extends the conclusions of Janet Yellen's "optimal control speeches" in 2012, which argued for pre-committing to keep short rates "lower-for-longer" than standard monetary rules would imply. The Wilcox paper dives into the murky waters of "endogenous supply", whereby the Fed needs to act aggressively to prevent temporary damage to US supply potential from becoming permanent. The overall message implicitly seems to accept that tapering will happen broadly on schedule, but this is offset by super-dovishness on the forward path for short rates.

The papers are long and complex, and deserve to be read in full by anyone seriously interested in the Fed's thought processes. They are, of course, full of caveats and they acknowledge that huge uncertainties are involved. But they seem to point to three main conclusions that are very important for investors.

1. They have moved on from the tapering decision.

Both papers give a few nods in the direction of the tapering debate, but they are written with the unspoken assumption that the expansion of the balance sheet is no longer the main issue. I think we can conclude from this that they believe with a fairly high degree of certainty that the start and end dates for tapering will not be altered by more than a few months either way, and that the end point for the total size of the balance sheet is therefore also known fairly accurately. From now on, the key decision from their point of view is how long to delay the initial hike in short rates, and exactly how the central bank should pre-commit on this question. By omission, the details of tapering are revealed to be secondary.

Yellen said as much in her testimony. In response to a question about QE, she said, "I would agree that this program [QE] cannot continue forever, that there are costs and risks associated with the program."
The Fed have painted themselves into a corner of their own creation. They are clearly very concerned about the stock market reaction even to the mere announcement of the onset of tapering. But they also know they cannot continue buying $85 billion of assets every month. Their balance sheet is already at $4 trillion and at the current pace will expand by $1 trillion a year. Although I can find no research that establishes a theoretical limit, I do believe the Fed does not want to find that limit by running into a wall. Further, it now appears that they recognize that QE is of limited effectiveness with market valuations where they are, and so for practical purposes they need to begin to withdraw QE.

But rather than let the market deal with the prospect of an end to an easy monetary policy (which everyone recognizes has to draw to an end at some point), they are now looking at ways to maintain the illusion of the power of the Federal Reserve. And they are right to be concerned about the market reaction, as was pointed out in a recent note from Ray Dalio and Bridgewater, as analyzed by Zero Hedge:

"The Fed's real dilemma is that its policy is creating a financial market bubble  that is large relative to the pickup in the economy that it is producing," Bridgewater notes, as the relationship between US equity markets and the Fed's balance sheet (here and here for example) and "disconcerting disconnects" (here and here) indicate how the Fed is "trapped." However, as the incoming Yellen faces up to her "tough" decisions to taper or not, Ray Dalio's team is concerned about something else – "We're not worried about whether the Fed is going to hit or release the gas pedal, we're worried about whether there's much gas left in the tank and what will happen if there isn't."

Dalio then outlines their dilemma neatly. "…The dilemma the Fed faces now is that the tools currently at its disposal are pretty much used up, in that interest rates are at zero and US asset prices have been driven up to levels that imply very low levels of returns relative to the risk, so there is very little ability to stimulate from here if needed. So the Fed will either need to accept that outcome, or come up with new ideas to stimulate conditions."

The new ideas that Bridgewater and everyone else are looking for are in the papers we are examining. Returning to Davies work (emphasis below is mine!):

2. They think that "optimal" monetary policy is very dovish indeed on the path for rates.

Both papers conduct optimal control exercises of the Yellen-type. These involve using macro-economic models to derive the path for forward short rates that optimise the behaviour of inflation and unemployment in coming years. The message is familiar: the Fed should pre-commit today to keep short rates at zero for a much longer period than would be implied by normal Taylor Rules, even though inflation would temporarily exceed 2 per cent, and unemployment would drop below the structural rate. This induces the economy to recover more quickly now, since real expected short rates are reduced.

Compared to previously published simulations, the new ones in the English paper are even more dovish. They imply that the first hike in short rates should be in 2017, a year later than before. More interestingly, they experiment with various thresholds that could be used to persuade the markets that the Fed really, really will keep short rates at zero, even if the economy recovers and inflation exceeds target. They conclude that the best way of doing this may be to set an unemployment threshold at 5.5 per cent, which is 1 per cent lower than the threshold currently in place, since this would produce the best mix of inflation and unemployment in the next few years. Such a low unemployment threshold has not been contemplated in the market up to now.

3. They think aggressively easy monetary policy is needed to prevent permanent supply side deterioration.

This theme has been mentioned briefly in previous Bernanke speeches, but the Wilcox paper elevates it to center stage. The paper concludes that the level of potential output has been reduced by about 7 per cent in recent years, largely because the rate of productivity growth has fallen sharply. In normal circumstances, this would carry a hawkish message for monetary policy, because it significantly reduces the amount of spare capacity available in the economy in the near term.

However, the key is that Wilcox thinks that much of the loss in productive potential has been caused by (or is "endogenous to") the weakness in demand. For example, the paper says that the low levels of capital investment would be reversed if demand were to recover more rapidly, as would part of the decline in the labour participation rate. In a reversal of Say's Law, and also a reversal of most US macro-economic thinking since Friedman, demand creates its own supply.

This concept is key to understanding current economic thinking. The belief is that it is demand that is the issue and that lower rates will stimulate increased demand (consumption), presumably by making loans cheaper for businesses and consumers. More leverage is needed! But current policy apparently fails to grasp that the problem is not the lack of consumption: it is the lack of income. Income is produced by productivity. When leverage increases productivity, that is good; but when it is used simply to purchase goods for current consumption, it merely brings future consumption forward. Debt incurred and spent today is future consumption denied. Back to Davies:

This new belief in endogenous supply clearly reinforces the "lower for longer" case on short rates, since aggressively easy monetary policy would be more likely to lead to permanent gains in real output, with only temporary costs in higher inflation. Whether or not any of this analysis turns out to be justified in the long run, it is surely important that it is now being argued so strongly in an important piece of Fed research. 

            Read that last sentence again. It makes no difference whether you and I might disagree with their analysis. They are at the helm, and unless something truly unexpected happens, we are going to get Fed assurances of low interest rates for a very long time. Davies concludes:

The implication of these papers is that these Fed economists have largely accepted in their own minds that tapering will take place sometime fairly soon, but that they simultaneously believe that rates should be held at zero until (say) 2017. They will clearly have a problem in convincing markets of this. After the events of the summer, bond traders have drawn the conclusion that tapering is a robust signal that higher interest rates are on the way. The FOMC will need to work very hard indeed to convince the markets, through its new thresholds and public pronouncements, that tapering and forward short rates really do need to be divorced this time. It could be a long struggle.

On a side note, we are beginning to see calls from certain circles to think about also reducing the rate the Fed pays on the reserves held at the Fed from the current 25 basis points as a way to encourage banks to put that money to work, although where exactly they put it to work is not part of the concern. Just do something with it. That is a development we will need to watch.

The Unintended Consequences of ZIRP

Off the top of my head I can come up with four ways that the proposed extension of ZIRP can have consequences other than those outlined in the papers. We will look briefly at each of them, although they each deserve their own letter.

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How To Position Yourself for a 10 Year Pattern Breakout

As mentioned last Friday just before things took a dive on the weekend, a look at the major market indices did not look promising. If we take an even longer term look and examine the monthly charts we can see that The S&P 500 as well as the Dow Jones have been approaching multi decade rising channel resistance lines. Further, they also appear to be forming bearish rising wedge patterns.

Monthly Long Term Chart Analysis & Thoughts....

As many of my longer term subscribers can attest to, I always preach that technical analysis is one part art and one part science: you can never be completely certain on what the outcome of a pattern is going to be. However, we can use historical analysis to make better investments. The great American Novelist Mark Twain probably said it best in that “history does not repeat itself, but it rhymes”. Regarding a rising wedge pattern, we know that roughly two thirds of the time they will break to the downside. This also means that one third of the time they break to the upside.

In accomplishing our goal of capital growth we must do a number of things. We must make returns on our investments, we must protect our investments, and we must limit our losses. While all three aspects work in tandem with each other, there are times when focus must be allocated to one specific approach.

Regarding the current technical setup, I’m not so focused on the 67% chance that these wedges will break to the downside, but more so the impact of each outcome on the average Joe’s portfolio and mom and pop businesses. The S&P 500 and the Dow are approaching long term resistance lines that have been in place for decades. If we do break to the downside, which I suspect we will, there could be a very significant sell off with consequences that no one can predict at this point though I mention some things in the chart above. Alternatively, there is significant overhead resistance in the various indices, and I don’t believe an upside break would be too monumental.

That being said, I always like to keep an open outlook and wait for the right opportunity. I’m trying to think of scenarios that would prelude further upside action and I really am not coming up with much. As evidenced by the completion of the recent 5 wave uptrend on the S&P that coincided nicely with the various quantitative easing policies, Ben Bernanke and the fed have had less and less impact. I truly can’t see many fiscal developments that would prompt any significant bullish action.

The only scenario I really think that could pump up equities is a series of positive earnings announcements. A lot of expectations, earnings numbers, guidance, etc… have been revised downwards over the last couple of quarters, so there is the opportunity for some positive surprises that could lead to some bullish price action. In absence of such a scenario, I really can’t think of much else that would prompt a run up.

Look at these charts of positive and negative earnings surprises… and the dates and remember what happened following this negative data....

Positive Earnings Surprise

Negative Earnings Surprise

That being said, I am recommending two courses of action. For those steadfast bulls, lock in some profits and/or buy some protection. Missing out on some of the upside is a lot better than losing some of the gains you have fought so hard for over the past couple of years. For the more aggressive traders and investors, start following my updates a little more regularly as I foresee many shorting opportunities coming up in the future. As many of you know, sell offs are often quick and abrupt, and timing is extremely important when playing the downside.

Further, trading could get very volatile in the near future. Historically, and even more so looking forward as August and September have been very costly for the average investor. Our focus will be in taking the highest probability trades that offer the best risk to reward scenarios. There will be times when we miss trades, and times when they’re not timed perfectly. But, as those who have been with me for a while can attest to, patience pays off in the long run....

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Chris Vermeulen

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The Federal Reserve, Gold, the S&P 500, & the Retail Mindset

The recent rally has been breathtaking, however the majority of investors have missed out on a large portion of these gains as significant levels of cash have been either moved to bond funds or taken out of equity markets consistently during this rally. Let’s face it, financial markets around the world are not what they once were.

U.S. equity markets in particular are manipulated by high frequency trading which is wreaking havoc in the marketplace in terms of potential short term volatility expansions and “flash crashes” that can be isolated to one underlying stock.

In addition to the high frequency trading robots, the Federal Reserve is equally involved in the direct manipulation of financial markets through record easing adjustments. The Federal Reserve has unleashed massive amounts of liquidity while keeping interest rates incredibly low which has produced an environment where the risk-on attitude permeates the landscape.

As a basic example of the failure of recent Federal Reserve policies and their impact generally on the valuation of various underlying assets, I submit for consideration to readers a 20 year price chart of the U.S. Dollar Index.

 20 Year U.S. Dollar Index Chart

It boggles the mind to consider that Chairman Bernanke routinely denies that the Federal Reserve has failed to maintainwhat he calls “price stability.” When looking at the chart of the valuation of the U.S. Dollar against a basket of foreign currencies, most 5^th graders if given the context would proclaim that the Federal Reserve has failed in their objective to maintain price stability.

As time passes and the financial crisis moves further into the rear view mirror, average Americans have varied views about the economy, the stock market, and trust in their government. For most Americans, the stock market does not make sense because they view the stock market and the economy as the same thing. Sophisticated investors understand that stocks and the economy are two totally separate issues, particularly with the amount of manipulation that has been taken place since 2007.

This manipulation has not gone unnoticed by the average American. Now more than ever regular people are not only distrustful of domestic financial markets, but they do not trust Wall Street, and for good reason. In light of this, data compiled during the recent uptrend suggests that retail investors have been pulling money out of equities for weeks even though prices continue to move higher. The chart shown below courtesy of ZeroHedge.com illustrates the recent trend.

U.S. Domestic Mutual Fund Flows

The chart above shows the price of SPY represented as the black line and equity fund inflows/outflows as the red area. As can be seen above, retail investors have been pulling massive amounts of capital out of equity based mutual funds over the past few months as equity prices have rallied. The retail crowd, commonly referred to as sheep or courtesy of Goldman Sachs “muppets,” are selling into the rally.

So why is the retail crowd selling? They do not believe that this rally will last because the real world around them is arguing in the face of everything that this rally stands for. Gasoline prices are crippling the lower and middle classes further reducing their disposable income. Higher food and energy prices paired with job scarcity and serious concerns have begun to mount.

The average retail investor believes the game is rigged at this point and the everyday investor is only helping Wall Street bankers fund their lavish lifestyles. Ultimately, the retail crowd likelybelieves that the only way to win the game is to simply not play.

Will time prove the supposed sheep wrong? Statistically one would think so, but in this case the retail folks may just be right. Headwinds surround the global macroeconomic landscape. Europe is moving into a recession which is being exacerbated by austerity measures. Data came out yesterday (Thursday) that the PMI in several European countries and China contracted. Ireland missed growth targets and central banks around the world continue to print unprecedented levels of fiat currency as if printing money and creating more debt will solve a debt problem.

All of these issues are concerns, but ultimately price is the final arbiter in the world of flickering ticks. From these eyes there are two possible outcomes for the price action in the S&P 500. The first outcome which I believe is more likely is a test of the 2011 highs which results in a snap-back rally that takes us deeper into the 1,420 – 1,440 resistance zone. The chart below demonstrates the bullish potential outcome.

SPX Bullish Outcome

Price action at some point will backtest the 2011 highs and the reaction at that point will be critical. Generally speaking price action does not break a key support or resistance level on the first attempt. Usually the 2^nd or 3^rd attempt will result in a break of a key support / resistance level.

In this case, a test in coming days would likely result in a bounce and reversion to the previous trend. A possible, albeit unlikely outcome would be a break below the 2011 support zone which would then come close to triggering a trend change. The daily chart below demonstrates the bearish potential outcome.

SPX Bearish Outcome

I do firmly believe that the U.S. Dollar Index will hold clues about the future for the price action of equities. According to cycle analysis, the Dollar should come into is daily cycle low sometime in the next few weeks, if not sooner.

From that low, we should see another move higher for the Dollar Index which I anticipate will test the recent highs near 81. The daily chart of the U.S. Dollar Index futures is shown below.

U.S. Dollar Index Futures Daily Chart

If my expectations are somewhat accurate, the short term weakness in the Dollar will assist stocks and risk assets in a move above recent highs. In the case of the S&P 500, a move to key resistance at 1,420 – 1,450 could occur.

Readers should keep in mind that weakness could be disguised as just a consolidation near the 20 period moving average which has occurred in the past when analyzing the Dollar Index. However, I would not rule out one more leg lower before the Dollar finds a bottom.

Gold, silver, and the miners have been under selling pressure for some time and are likely due for a bounce to the upside. The weakness in the Dollar discussed above would allow precious metals and miners to work off some of the short term oversold conditions that we are seeing presently. The daily chart of gold futures is shown below.

Gold Futures Daily Chart

After a move higher into or around the $1,700 / ounce price level for gold, I believe that another leg lower will be quite likely.

Conclusion

Readers should be mindful that the 1^st Quarter will end on March 30^th for financial markets. Window dressing and portfolio painting are likely to occur next week. I would not be at all surprised to see the tape painted to the upside during the final week of March after this brief pullback that we witnessed on Thursday and Friday morning.

Money managers want to show off their returns while demonstrating ownership of key names that drove performance during the quarter such as AAPL. I expect the price action on Friday and the rest of next week to have relatively light volume and a bias to the upside.

Barring any major financial news or geopolitical event, I do not expect to see price action work below the 2011 highs in the near term. The possibility cannot be totally ruled out, but it would seemingly be a rare occurrence to see a major support level break down on the first back test attempt. We may see lower prices early next week, but if the 2011 highs hold the bulls remain in control in the short term.

The real question readers should ask themselves is if prices do extend higher and we reach my target resistance zone for the S&P 500, will the retail crowd jump in and push prices higher, or will the banks be trading with each other as a major top forms? In coming days and weeks we should find out once and for all just who the real muppets truly are.

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